Yes, attackers can — and very frequently do — move laterally after compromising just one account. A single breached credential (especially a domain-joined user's) often provides enough foothold to pivot across dozens or hundreds of systems, escalate privileges, and eventually reach domain admin or crown-jewel assets.

In 2025–2026 threat landscapes, ransomware groups like Akira, RansomHub, and others routinely turn one compromised user account into full network dominance within hours by chaining credential theft, living-off-the-land techniques, and abuse of native protocols. The initial foothold is rarely the endgame; lateral movement is where small incidents explode into major breaches.

Why One Compromised Account Is Often Enough

Most organizations still rely heavily on Active Directory (or hybrid Entra ID setups) where:

• Many users have local admin rights on their workstations (or shared local admin groups).
• Credentials are cached/reused across systems (e.g., via NTLM hashes, Kerberos tickets).
• Legitimate remote access tools (RDP, WMI, WinRM, SMB) are enabled by default for IT convenience.
• Service accounts, shared passwords, or over-permissive groups create hidden paths.

Once attackers land on one endpoint with valid credentials, they can:

1. Dump credentials from memory (LSASS process) using tools like Mimikatz or built-in methods → harvest NTLM hashes, Kerberos tickets, or plaintext passwords.
2. Use those credentials to authenticate elsewhere without knowing the actual password (Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, Over-Pass-the-Hash).
3. Pivot using native Windows tools that blend in with admin activity.

Real-World Lateral Movement Techniques (2025–2026 Edition)

Here are the most common paths attackers take after snagging one user account:

• Pass-the-Hash (PtH) — Use stolen NTLM hash to authenticate to remote systems via SMB, WMI, or PsExec. No plaintext password needed.
• Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) / Over-Pass-the-Hash — Steal/export Kerberos tickets (TGTs or service tickets) and inject them to impersonate the user on other domain machines.
• RDP Abuse — Log in remotely via Remote Desktop with the compromised creds; hijack existing sessions or spray to other hosts.
• WMI / PowerShell Remoting (WinRM) — Execute commands remotely (Invoke-Command, wmic, etc.) — stealthy and often allowed for admins.
• SMB / File Share Pivoting — Access ADMIN,C , C$,C$, IPC$ shares to copy tools, dump SAM, or stage payloads.
• Kerberoasting — Request service tickets for SPNs, crack offline to get service account creds (frequent escalation path).
• Credential Dumping + Reuse — Grab hashes from one machine, spray across the network looking for matches (password reuse is still rampant).
• Hybrid AD/Entra ID Exploits — In 2025 Black Hat revelations: manipulate Seamless SSO keys or Entra ID Connect to forge tickets bypassing MFA for synced users.

Even a standard user account (no local admin) can lead to lateral movement if:

• The user can RDP to servers.
• They belong to groups with remote access rights.
• They have sessions on jump servers.
• Phishing yields MFA fatigue bypass or token theft.

How Attackers Chain It: Typical Flow After One Compromise

1. Initial foothold (phish → malware → stolen creds).
2. Recon: net group "Domain Admins" /domain, scan for open RDP/WinRM/SMB.
3. Credential access: Mimikatz or procdump on LSASS.
4. Pivot: Use harvested creds to hit 10–50 other hosts.
5. Escalate: Find a service account or local admin hash → domain dominance.
6. Impact: Deploy ransomware, exfiltrate, or persist.

Time from initial compromise to lateral spread: often minutes to hours in poorly segmented environments.

Prevention: Make Lateral Movement Expensive

You can't stop every initial compromise, but you can make pivoting painful:

• Enforce MFA everywhere (including on-prem where possible — e.g., UserLock or phishing-resistant methods).
• Network segmentation / microsegmentation — Zero-trust style; block unnecessary lateral protocols (RDP, SMBv1, WMI over internet).
• Least privilege — Remove local admin rights; use Just-Enough-Administration (JEA) for PowerShell.
• Credential hygiene — LAPS for local admins; frequent rotation; block NTLM where possible; monitor for Kerberoastable accounts.
• EDR / identity monitoring — Detect LSASS access, anomalous logons (Event ID 4624 Type 3), unusual RDP/WMI.
• Disable legacy protocols — Turn off NTLM, restrict WinRM to hardened hosts.
• Patch & monitor aggressively — Especially privilege-escalation vectors.

Bottom Line

One compromised account is rarely "just one account." In most environments, it's a skeleton key to the kingdom unless you've deliberately broken the lateral paths. The 2025–2026 reality: prevention fails, but containment wins. Focus on starving attackers of movement options after the inevitable breach.

Stay segmented, monitor identity aggressively, and assume compromise — because attackers certainly do.