The Artificial intelligence is the application of human intelligence processes by the machines or computer systems. The applications of AI include expert systems, natural language processing, speech recognition and machine vision.
Artificial intelligence (AI)
The ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings. The term is frequently applied to the project of developing systems endowed with the intellectual processes characteristic of humans, such as the ability to reason, discover meaning, generalize, or learn from past experience. Since the development of the digital computer in the 1940s, it has been demonstrated that computers can be programmed to carry out very complex tasks—such as discovering proofs for mathematical theorems or playing chess—with great proficiency. Still, despite continuing advances in computer processing speed and memory capacity, there are as yet no programs that can match full human flexibility over wider domains or in tasks requiring much everyday knowledge. On the other hand, some programs have attained the performance levels of human experts and professionals in performing certain specific tasks, so that artificial intelligence in this limited sense is found in applications as diverse as medical diagnosis, computer search engines, voice or handwriting recognition, and chatbots.What is intelligence?
All but the simplest human behaviour is ascribed to intelligence, while even the most complicated insect behaviour is usually not taken as an indication of intelligence. What is the difference? Consider the behaviour of the digger wasp, Sphex ichneumoneus. When the female wasp returns to her burrow with food, she first deposits it on the threshold, checks for intruders inside her burrow, and only then, if the coast is clear, carries her food inside. The real nature of the wasp’s instinctual behaviour is revealed if the food is moved a few inches away from the entrance to her burrow while she is inside: on emerging, she will repeat the whole procedure as often as the food is displaced. Intelligence—conspicuously absent in the case of Sphex—must include the ability to adapt to new circumstances.Learning
There are a number of different forms of learning as applied to artificial intelligence. The simplest is learning by trial and error. For example, a simple computer program for solving mate-in-one chess problems might try moves at random until mate is found. The program might then store the solution with the position so that the next time the computer encountered the same position it would recall the solution. This simple memorizing of individual items and procedures—known as rote learning—is relatively easy to implement on a computer. More challenging is the problem of implementing what is called generalization. Generalization involves applying past experience to analogous new situations. For example, a program that learns the past tense of regular English verbs by rote will not be able to produce the past tense of a word such as jump unless it previously had been presented with jumped, whereas a program that is able to generalize can learn the “add ed” rule and so form the past tense of jump based on experience with similar verbs.
Reasoning
To reason is to draw inferences appropriate to the situation. Inferences are classified as either deductive or inductive. An example of the former is, “Fred must be in either the museum or the café. He is not in the café; therefore he is in the museum,” and of the latter, “Previous accidents of this sort were caused by instrument failure; therefore this accident was caused by instrument failure.” The most significant difference between these forms of reasoning is that in the deductive case the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion, whereas in the inductive case the truth of the premise lends support to the conclusion without giving absolute assurance. Inductive reasoning is common in science, where data are collected and tentative models are developed to describe and predict future behaviour—until the appearance of anomalous data forces the model to be revised. Deductive reasoning is common in mathematics and logic, where elaborate structures of irrefutable theorems are built up from a small set of basic axioms and rules. There has been considerable success in programming computers to draw inferences. However, true reasoning involves more than just drawing inferences: it involves drawing inferences relevant to the solution of the particular task or situation. This is one of the hardest problems confronting AI.
Problem solving
Problem solving, particularly in artificial intelligence, may be characterized as a systematic search through a range of possible actions in order to reach some predefined goal or solution. Problem-solving methods divide into special purpose and general purpose. A special-purpose method is tailor-made for a particular problem and often exploits very specific features of the situation in which the problem is embedded. In contrast, a general-purpose method is applicable to a wide variety of problems. One general-purpose technique used in AI is means-end analysis—a step-by-step, or incremental, reduction of the difference between the current state and the final goal. The program selects actions from a list of means—in the case of a simple robot this might consist of PICKUP, PUTDOWN, MOVEFORWARD, MOVEBACK, MOVELEFT, and MOVERIGHT—until the goal is reached.
Perception
In perception the environment is scanned by means of various sensory organs, real or artificial, and the scene is decomposed into separate objects in various spatial relationships. Analysis is complicated by the fact that an object may appear different depending on the angle from which it is viewed, the direction and intensity of illumination in the scene, and how much the object contrasts with the surrounding field.
One of the earliest systems to integrate perception and action was FREDDY, a stationary robot with a moving television eye and a pincer hand, constructed at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, during the period 1966–73 under the direction of Donald Michie. FREDDY was able to recognize a variety of objects and could be instructed to assemble simple artifacts, such as a toy car, from a random heap of components. At present, artificial perception is sufficiently advanced to enable optical sensors to identify individuals and autonomous vehicles to drive at moderate speeds on the open road.
Language
A language is a system of signs having meaning by convention. In this sense, language need not be confined to the spoken word. Traffic signs, for example, form a mini-language, it being a matter of convention that ⚠ means “hazard ahead” in some countries. It is distinctive of languages that linguistic units possess meaning by convention, and linguistic meaning is very different from what is called natural meaning, exemplified in statements such as “Those clouds mean rain” and “The fall in pressure means the valve is malfunctioning.”
An important characteristic of full-fledged human languages—in contrast to birdcalls and traffic signs—is their productivity. A productive language can formulate an unlimited variety of sentences.
Large language models like ChatGPT can respond fluently in a human language to questions and statements. Although such models do not actually understand language as humans do but merely select words that are more probable than others, they have reached the point where their command of a language is indistinguishable from that of a normal human. What, then, is involved in genuine understanding, if even a computer that uses language like a native human speaker is not acknowledged to understand? There is no universally agreed upon answer to this difficult question.
Methods and goals in AI
Symbolic vs. connectionist approaches
AI research follows two distinct, and to some extent competing, methods, the symbolic (or “top-down”) approach, and the connectionist (or “bottom-up”) approach. The top-down approach seeks to replicate intelligence by analyzing cognition independent of the biological structure of the brain, in terms of the processing of symbols—whence the symbolic label. The bottom-up approach, on the other hand, involves creating artificial neural networks in imitation of the brain’s structure—whence the connectionist label.
To illustrate the difference between these approaches, consider the task of building a system, equipped with an optical scanner, that recognizes the letters of the alphabet. A bottom-up approach typically involves training an artificial neural network by presenting letters to it one by one, gradually improving performance by “tuning” the network. (Tuning adjusts the responsiveness of different neural pathways to different stimuli.) In contrast, a top-down approach typically involves writing a computer program that compares each letter with geometric descriptions. Simply put, neural activities are the basis of the bottom-up approach, while symbolic descriptions are the basis of the top-down approach.
In The Fundamentals of Learning (1932), Edward Thorndike, a psychologist at Columbia University, New York City, first suggested that human learning consists of some unknown property of connections between neurons in the brain. In The Organization of Behavior (1949), Donald Hebb, a psychologist at McGill University, Montreal, Canada, suggested that learning specifically involves strengthening certain patterns of neural activity by increasing the probability (weight) of induced neuron firing between the associated connections. The notion of weighted connections is described in a later section, Connectionism.
In 1957 two vigorous advocates of symbolic AI—Allen Newell, a researcher at the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, and Herbert Simon, a psychologist and computer scientist at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania—summed up the top-down approach in what they called the physical symbol system hypothesis. This hypothesis states that processing structures of symbols is sufficient, in principle, to produce artificial intelligence in a digital computer and that, moreover, human intelligence is the result of the same type of symbolic manipulations.
During the 1950s and ’60s the top-down and bottom-up approaches were pursued simultaneously, and both achieved noteworthy, if limited, results. During the 1970s, however, bottom-up AI was neglected, and it was not until the 1980s that this approach again became prominent. Nowadays both approaches are followed, and both are acknowledged as facing difficulties. Symbolic techniques work in simplified realms but typically break down when confronted with the real world; meanwhile, bottom-up researchers have been unable to replicate the nervous systems of even the simplest living things. Caenorhabditis elegans, a much-studied worm, has approximately 300 neurons whose pattern of interconnections is perfectly known. Yet connectionist models have failed to mimic even this worm. Evidently, the neurons of connectionist theory are gross oversimplifications of the real thing.
Artificial general intelligence (AGI), applied AI, and cognitive simulation
Employing the methods outlined above, AI research attempts to reach one of three goals: artificial general intelligence (AGI), applied AI, or cognitive simulation. AGI (also called strong AI) aims to build machines that think. The ultimate ambition of AGI is to produce a machine whose overall intellectual ability is indistinguishable from that of a human being. As is described in the section Early milestones in AI, this goal generated great interest in the 1950s and ’60s, but such optimism has given way to an appreciation of the extreme difficulties involved. To date, progress has been meagre. Some critics doubt whether research will produce even a system with the overall intellectual ability of an ant in the foreseeable future. Indeed, some researchers working in AI’s other two branches view AGI as not worth pursuing.
Applied AI, also known as advanced information processing, aims to produce commercially viable “smart” systems—for example, “expert” medical diagnosis systems and stock-trading systems. Applied AI has enjoyed considerable success, as described in the section Expert systems.
In cognitive simulation, computers are used to test theories about how the human mind works—for example, theories about how people recognize faces or recall memories. Cognitive simulation is already a powerful tool in both neuroscience and cognitive psychology.
Alan Turing and the beginning of AI
Theoretical work
The earliest substantial work in the field of artificial intelligence was done in the mid-20th century by the British logician and computer pioneer Alan Mathison Turing. In 1935 Turing described an abstract computing machine consisting of a limitless memory and a scanner that moves back and forth through the memory, symbol by symbol, reading what it finds and writing further symbols. The actions of the scanner are dictated by a program of instructions that also is stored in the memory in the form of symbols. This is Turing’s stored-program concept, and implicit in it is the possibility of the machine operating on, and so modifying or improving, its own program. Turing’s conception is now known simply as the universal Turing machine. All modern computers are in essence universal Turing machines.
During World War II, Turing was a leading cryptanalyst at the Government Code and Cypher School in Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire, England. Turing could not turn to the project of building a stored-program electronic computing machine until the cessation of hostilities in Europe in 1945. Nevertheless, during the war he gave considerable thought to the issue of machine intelligence. One of Turing’s colleagues at Bletchley Park, Donald Michie (who later founded the Department of Machine Intelligence and Perception at the University of Edinburgh), later recalled that Turing often discussed how computers could learn from experience as well as solve new problems through the use of guiding principles—a process now known as heuristic problem solving.
Turing gave quite possibly the earliest public lecture (London, 1947) to mention computer intelligence, saying, “What we want is a machine that can learn from experience,” and that the “possibility of letting the machine alter its own instructions provides the mechanism for this.” In 1948 he introduced many of the central concepts of AI in a report entitled “Intelligent Machinery.” However, Turing did not publish this paper, and many of his ideas were later reinvented by others. For instance, one of Turing’s original ideas was to train a network of artificial neurons to perform specific tasks, an approach described in the section Connectionism.
Chess
At Bletchley Park, Turing illustrated his ideas on machine intelligence by reference to chess—a useful source of challenging and clearly defined problems against which proposed methods for problem solving could be tested. In principle, a chess-playing computer could play by searching exhaustively through all the available moves, but in practice this is impossible because it would involve examining an astronomically large number of moves. Heuristics are necessary to guide a narrower, more discriminative search. Although Turing experimented with designing chess programs, he had to content himself with theory in the absence of a computer to run his chess program. The first true AI programs had to await the arrival of stored-program electronic digital computers.
In 1945 Turing predicted that computers would one day play very good chess, and just over 50 years later, in 1997, Deep Blue, a chess computer built by IBM (International Business Machines Corporation), beat the reigning world champion, Garry Kasparov, in a six-game match. While Turing’s prediction came true, his expectation that chess programming would contribute to the understanding of how human beings think did not. The huge improvement in computer chess since Turing’s day is attributable to advances in computer engineering rather than advances in AI: Deep Blue’s 256 parallel processors enabled it to examine 200 million possible moves per second and to look ahead as many as 14 turns of play. Many agree with Noam Chomsky, a linguist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), who opined that a computer beating a grandmaster at chess is about as interesting as a bulldozer winning an Olympic weightlifting competition.
The Turing test
In 1950 Turing sidestepped the traditional debate concerning the definition of intelligence, introducing a practical test for computer intelligence that is now known simply as the Turing test. The Turing test involves three participants: a computer, a human interrogator, and a human foil. The interrogator attempts to determine, by asking questions of the other two participants, which is the computer. All communication is via keyboard and display screen. The interrogator may ask questions as penetrating and wide-ranging as he or she likes, and the computer is permitted to do everything possible to force a wrong identification. (For instance, the computer might answer “No” in response to “Are you a computer?” and might follow a request to multiply one large number by another with a long pause and an incorrect answer.) The foil must help the interrogator to make a correct identification. A number of different people play the roles of interrogator and foil, and, if a sufficient proportion of the interrogators are unable to distinguish the computer from the human being, then (according to proponents of Turing’s test) the computer is considered an intelligent, thinking entity.
In 1991 the American philanthropist Hugh Loebner started the annual Loebner Prize competition, promising a $100,000 payout to the first computer to pass the Turing test and awarding $2,000 each year to the best effort. However, no AI program has come close to passing an undiluted Turing test. In late 2022 the advent of the large language model ChatGPT reignited conversation about the likelihood that the components of the Turing test had been met. Buzzfeed data scientist Max Woolf said that ChatGPT had passed the Turing test in December 2022, but some experts claim that ChatGPT did not pass a true Turing test, because, in ordinary usage, ChatGPT often states that it is a language model.
Early milestones in AI
The first AI programs
The earliest successful AI program was written in 1951 by Christopher Strachey, later director of the Programming Research Group at the University of Oxford. Strachey’s checkers (draughts) program ran on the Ferranti Mark I computer at the University of Manchester, England. By the summer of 1952 this program could play a complete game of checkers at a reasonable speed.
Information about the earliest successful demonstration of machine learning was published in 1952. Shopper, written by Anthony Oettinger at the University of Cambridge, ran on the EDSAC computer. Shopper’s simulated world was a mall of eight shops. When instructed to purchase an item, Shopper would search for it, visiting shops at random until the item was found. While searching, Shopper would memorize a few of the items stocked in each shop visited (just as a human shopper might). The next time Shopper was sent out for the same item, or for some other item that it had already located, it would go to the right shop straight away. This simple form of learning, as is pointed out in the introductory section What is intelligence?, is called rote learning.
The first AI program to run in the United States also was a checkers program, written in 1952 by Arthur Samuel for the prototype of the IBM 701. Samuel took over the essentials of Strachey’s checkers program and over a period of years considerably extended it. In 1955 he added features that enabled the program to learn from experience. Samuel included mechanisms for both rote learning and generalization, enhancements that eventually led to his program’s winning one game against a former Connecticut checkers champion in 1962.
Evolutionary computing
Samuel’s checkers program was also notable for being one of the first efforts at evolutionary computing. (His program “evolved” by pitting a modified copy against the current best version of his program, with the winner becoming the new standard.) Evolutionary computing typically involves the use of some automatic method of generating and evaluating successive “generations” of a program, until a highly proficient solution evolves.
A leading proponent of evolutionary computing, John Holland, also wrote test software for the prototype of the IBM 701 computer. In particular, he helped design a neural-network “virtual” rat that could be trained to navigate through a maze. This work convinced Holland of the efficacy of the bottom-up approach. While continuing to consult for IBM, Holland moved to the University of Michigan in 1952 to pursue a doctorate in mathematics. He soon switched, however, to a new interdisciplinary program in computers and information processing (later known as communications science) created by Arthur Burks, one of the builders of ENIAC and its successor EDVAC. In his 1959 dissertation, for most likely the world’s first computer science Ph.D., Holland proposed a new type of computer—a multiprocessor computer—that would assign each artificial neuron in a network to a separate processor. (In 1985 Daniel Hillis solved the engineering difficulties to build the first such computer, the 65,536-processor Thinking Machines Corporation supercomputer.)
Holland joined the faculty at Michigan after graduation and over the next four decades directed much of the research into methods of automating evolutionary computing, a process now known by the term genetic algorithms. Systems implemented in Holland’s laboratory included a chess program, models of single-cell biological organisms, and a classifier system for controlling a simulated gas-pipeline network. Genetic algorithms are no longer restricted to “academic” demonstrations, however; in one important practical application, a genetic algorithm cooperates with a witness to a crime in order to generate a portrait of the criminal.
Logical reasoning and problem solving
The ability to reason logically is an important aspect of intelligence and has always been a major focus of AI research. An important landmark in this area was a theorem-proving program written in 1955–56 by Allen Newell and J. Clifford Shaw of the RAND Corporation and Herbert Simon of the Carnegie Mellon University. The Logic Theorist, as the program became known, was designed to prove theorems from Principia Mathematica (1910–13), a three-volume work by the British philosopher-mathematicians Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell. In one instance, a proof devised by the program was more elegant than the proof given in the books.
Newell, Simon, and Shaw went on to write a more powerful program, the General Problem Solver, or GPS. The first version of GPS ran in 1957, and work continued on the project for about a decade. GPS could solve an impressive variety of puzzles using a trial and error approach. However, one criticism of GPS, and similar programs that lack any learning capability, is that the program’s intelligence is entirely secondhand, coming from whatever information the programmer explicitly includes.
English dialogue
Two of the best-known early AI programs, Eliza and Parry, gave an eerie semblance of intelligent conversation. (Details of both were first published in 1966.) Eliza, written by Joseph Weizenbaum of MIT’s AI Laboratory, simulated a human therapist. Parry, written by Stanford University psychiatrist Kenneth Colby, simulated a human paranoiac. Psychiatrists who were asked to decide whether they were communicating with Parry or a human paranoiac were often unable to tell. Nevertheless, neither Parry nor Eliza could reasonably be described as intelligent. Parry’s contributions to the conversation were canned—constructed in advance by the programmer and stored away in the computer’s memory. Eliza too relied on canned sentences and simple programming tricks.
AI programming languages
In the course of their work on the Logic Theorist and GPS, Newell, Simon, and Shaw developed their Information Processing Language (IPL), a computer language tailored for AI programming. At the heart of IPL was a highly flexible data structure that they called a list. A list is simply an ordered sequence of items of data. Some or all of the items in a list may themselves be lists. This scheme leads to richly branching structures.
In 1960 John McCarthy combined elements of IPL with the lambda calculus (a formal mathematical-logical system) to produce the programming language LISP (List Processor), which for decades was the principal language for AI work in the United States, before it was supplanted in the 21st century by such languages as Python, Java, and C++. (The lambda calculus itself was invented in 1936 by the Princeton logician Alonzo Church while he was investigating the abstract Entscheidungsproblem, or “decision problem,” for predicate logic—the same problem that Turing had been attacking when he invented the universal Turing machine.)
The logic programming language PROLOG (Programmation en Logique) was conceived by Alain Colmerauer at the University of Aix-Marseille, France, where the language was first implemented in 1973. PROLOG was further developed by the logician Robert Kowalski, a member of the AI group at the University of Edinburgh. This language makes use of a powerful theorem-proving technique known as resolution, invented in 1963 at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission’s Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois by the British logician Alan Robinson. PROLOG can determine whether or not a given statement follows logically from other given statements. For example, given the statements “All logicians are rational” and “Robinson is a logician,” a PROLOG program responds in the affirmative to the query “Robinson is rational?” PROLOG was widely used for AI work, especially in Europe and Japan.
Microworld programs
To cope with the bewildering complexity of the real world, scientists often ignore less relevant details; for instance, physicists often ignore friction and elasticity in their models. In 1970 Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert of the MIT AI Laboratory proposed that, likewise, AI research should focus on developing programs capable of intelligent behaviour in simpler artificial environments known as microworlds. Much research has focused on the so-called blocks world, which consists of coloured blocks of various shapes and sizes arrayed on a flat surface.
An early success of the microworld approach was SHRDLU, written by Terry Winograd of MIT. (Details of the program were published in 1972.) SHRDLU controlled a robot arm that operated above a flat surface strewn with play blocks. Both the arm and the blocks were virtual. SHRDLU would respond to commands typed in natural English, such as “Will you please stack up both of the red blocks and either a green cube or a pyramid.” The program could also answer questions about its own actions. Although SHRDLU was initially hailed as a major breakthrough, Winograd soon announced that the program was, in fact, a dead end. The techniques pioneered in the program proved unsuitable for application in wider, more interesting worlds. Moreover, the appearance that SHRDLU gave of understanding the blocks microworld, and English statements concerning it, was in fact an illusion. SHRDLU had no idea what a green block was.
In 1965 the AI researcher Edward Feigenbaum and the geneticist Joshua Lederberg, both of Stanford University, began work on Heuristic DENDRAL (later shortened to DENDRAL), a chemical-analysis expert system. The substance to be analyzed might, for example, be a complicated compound of carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen. Starting from spectrographic data obtained from the substance, DENDRAL would hypothesize the substance’s molecular structure. DENDRAL’s performance rivaled that of chemists expert at this task, and the program was used in industry and in academia.
MYCIN
Work on MYCIN, an expert system for treating blood infections, began at Stanford University in 1972. MYCIN would attempt to diagnose patients based on reported symptoms and medical test results. The program could request further information concerning the patient, as well as suggest additional laboratory tests, to arrive at a probable diagnosis, after which it would recommend a course of treatment. If requested, MYCIN would explain the reasoning that led to its diagnosis and recommendation. Using about 500 production rules, MYCIN operated at roughly the same level of competence as human specialists in blood infections and rather better than general practitioners.
Nevertheless, expert systems have no common sense or understanding of the limits of their expertise. For instance, if MYCIN were told that a patient who had received a gunshot wound was bleeding to death, the program would attempt to diagnose a bacterial cause for the patient’s symptoms. Expert systems can also act on absurd clerical errors, such as prescribing an obviously incorrect dosage of a drug for a patient whose weight and age data were accidentally transposed.
The CYC project
CYC is a large experiment in symbolic AI. The project began in 1984 under the auspices of the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation, a consortium of computer, semiconductor, and electronics manufacturers. In 1995 Douglas Lenat, the CYC project director, spun off the project as Cycorp, Inc., based in Austin, Texas. The most ambitious goal of Cycorp was to build a KB containing a significant percentage of the commonsense knowledge of a human being. Millions of commonsense assertions, or rules, were coded into CYC. The expectation was that this “critical mass” would allow the system itself to extract further rules directly from ordinary prose and eventually serve as the foundation for future generations of expert systems.
Connectionism
Connectionism, or neuronlike computing, developed out of attempts to understand how the human brain works at the neural level and, in particular, how people learn and remember. In 1943 the neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch of the University of Illinois and the mathematician Walter Pitts of the University of Chicago published an influential treatise on neural nets and automatons, according to which each neuron in the brain is a simple digital processor and the brain as a whole is a form of computing machine. As McCulloch put it subsequently, “What we thought we were doing (and I think we succeeded fairly well) was treating the brain as a Turing machine.”
Creating an artificial neural network
It was not until 1954, however, that Belmont Farley and Wesley Clark of MIT succeeded in running the first artificial neural network—albeit limited by computer memory to no more than 128 neurons. They were able to train their networks to recognize simple patterns. In addition, they discovered that the random destruction of up to 10 percent of the neurons in a trained network did not affect the network’s performance—a feature that is reminiscent of the brain’s ability to tolerate limited damage inflicted by surgery, accident, or disease.
The simple neural network depicted in the figure illustrates the central ideas of connectionism. Four of the network’s five neurons are for input, and the fifth—to which each of the others is connected—is for output. Each of the neurons is either firing (1) or not firing (0). Each connection leading to N, the output neuron, has a “weight.” What is called the total weighted input into N is calculated by adding up the weights of all the connections leading to N from neurons that are firing. For example, suppose that only two of the input neurons, X and Y, are firing. Since the weight of the connection from X to N is 1.5 and the weight of the connection from Y to N is 2, it follows that the total weighted input to N is 3.5. As shown in the figure, N has a firing threshold of 4. That is to say, if N’s total weighted input equals or exceeds 4, then N fires; otherwise, N does not fire. So, for example, N does not fire if the only input neurons to fire are X and Y, but N does fire if X, Y, and Z all fire.
Training the network involves two steps. First, the external agent inputs a pattern and observes the behaviour of N. Second, the agent adjusts the connection weights in accordance with the rules:
- If the actual output is 0 and the desired output is 1, increase by a small fixed amount the weight of each connection leading to N from neurons that are firing (thus making it more likely that N will fire the next time the network is given the same pattern);
- If the actual output is 1 and the desired output is 0, decrease by that same small amount the weight of each connection leading to the output neuron from neurons that are firing (thus making it less likely that the output neuron will fire the next time the network is given that pattern as input).
The external agent—actually a computer program—goes through this two-step procedure with each pattern in a training sample, which is then repeated a number of times. During these many repetitions, a pattern of connection weights is forged that enables the network to respond correctly to each pattern. The striking thing is that the learning process is entirely mechanical and requires no human intervention or adjustment. The connection weights are increased or decreased automatically by a constant amount, and exactly the same learning procedure applies to different tasks.
Perceptrons
In 1957 Frank Rosenblatt of the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, began investigating artificial neural networks that he called perceptrons. He made major contributions to the field of AI, both through experimental investigations of the properties of neural networks (using computer simulations) and through detailed mathematical analysis. Rosenblatt was a charismatic communicator, and there were soon many research groups in the United States studying perceptrons. Rosenblatt and his followers called their approach connectionist to emphasize the importance in learning of the creation and modification of connections between neurons. Modern researchers have adopted this term.
One of Rosenblatt’s contributions was to generalize the training procedure that Farley and Clark had applied to only two-layer networks so that the procedure could be applied to multilayer networks. Rosenblatt used the phrase “back-propagating error correction” to describe his method. The method, with substantial improvements and extensions by numerous scientists, and the term back-propagation are now in everyday use in connectionism.
Conjugating verbs
In one famous connectionist experiment conducted at the University of California at San Diego (published in 1986), David Rumelhart and James McClelland trained a network of 920 artificial neurons, arranged in two layers of 460 neurons, to form the past tenses of English verbs. Root forms of verbs—such as come, look, and sleep—were presented to one layer of neurons, the input layer. A supervisory computer program observed the difference between the actual response at the layer of output neurons and the desired response—came, say—and then mechanically adjusted the connections throughout the network in accordance with the procedure described above to give the network a slight push in the direction of the correct response. About 400 different verbs were presented one by one to the network, and the connections were adjusted after each presentation. This whole procedure was repeated about 200 times using the same verbs, after which the network could correctly form the past tense of many unfamiliar verbs as well as of the original verbs. For example, when presented for the first time with guard, the network responded guarded; with weep, wept; with cling, clung; and with drip, dripped (complete with double p). This is a striking example of learning involving generalization. (Sometimes, though, the peculiarities of English were too much for the network, and it formed squawked from squat, shipped from shape, and membled from mail.)
Another name for connectionism is parallel distributed processing, which emphasizes two important features. First, a large number of relatively simple processors—the neurons—operate in parallel. Second, neural networks store information in a distributed fashion, with each individual connection participating in the storage of many different items of information. The know-how that enabled the past-tense network to form wept from weep, for example, was not stored in one specific location in the network but was spread throughout the entire pattern of connection weights that was forged during training. The human brain also appears to store information in a distributed fashion, and connectionist research is contributing to attempts to understand how it does so.
Other neural networks
Other work on neuronlike computing includes the following:
- Visual perception. Networks can recognize faces and other objects from visual data. For example, neural networks can distinguish whether an animal in a picture is a cat or a dog. Such networks can also distinguish a group of people as separate individuals.
- Language processing. Neural networks are able to convert handwritten and typewritten material to electronic text. Neural networks also convert speech to printed text and printed text to speech.
- Financial analysis. Neural networks are being used increasingly for loan risk assessment, real estate valuation, bankruptcy prediction, share price prediction, and other business applications.
- Medicine. Medical applications include detecting lung nodules and heart arrhythmias and predicting adverse drug reactions.
- Telecommunications. Telecommunications applications of neural networks include control of telephone switching networks and echo cancellation on satellite links.
New foundations
The approach known as nouvelle AI was pioneered at the MIT AI Laboratory by the Australian Rodney Brooks during the latter half of the 1980s. Nouvelle AI distances itself from strong AI, with its emphasis on human-level performance, in favour of the relatively modest aim of insect-level performance. At a very fundamental level, nouvelle AI rejects symbolic AI’s reliance upon constructing internal models of reality, such as those described in the section Microworld programs. Practitioners of nouvelle AI assert that true intelligence involves the ability to function in a real-world environment.
A central idea of nouvelle AI is that intelligence, as expressed by complex behaviour, “emerges” from the interaction of a few simple behaviours. For example, a robot whose simple behaviours include collision avoidance and motion toward a moving object will appear to stalk the object, pausing whenever it gets too close.
One famous example of nouvelle AI was Brooks’s robot Herbert (named after Herbert Simon), whose environment was the busy offices of the MIT AI Laboratory. Herbert searched desks and tables for empty soda cans, which it picked up and carried away. The robot’s seemingly goal-directed behaviour emerged from the interaction of about 15 simple behaviours.
Nouvelle AI sidesteps the frame problem discussed in the section The CYC project. Nouvelle systems do not contain a complicated symbolic model of their environment. Instead, information is left “out in the world” until such time as the system needs it. A nouvelle system refers continuously to its sensors rather than to an internal model of the world: it “reads off” the external world whatever information it needs at precisely the time it needs it. (As Brooks insisted, the world is its own best model—always exactly up-to-date and complete in every detail.)
The situated approach
Traditional AI has by and large attempted to build disembodied intelligences whose only interaction with the world has been indirect (CYC, for example). Nouvelle AI, on the other hand, attempts to build embodied intelligences situated in the real world—a method that has come to be known as the situated approach. Brooks quoted approvingly from the brief sketches that Turing gave in 1948 and 1950 of the situated approach. By equipping a machine “with the best sense organs that money can buy,” Turing wrote, the machine might be taught “to understand and speak English” by a process that would “follow the normal teaching of a child.” Turing contrasted this with the approach to AI that focuses on abstract activities, such as the playing of chess. He advocated that both approaches be pursued, but until nouvelle AI little attention was paid to the situated approach.
The situated approach was also anticipated in the writings of the philosopher Bert Dreyfus of the University of California at Berkeley. Beginning in the early 1960s, Dreyfus opposed the physical symbol system hypothesis, arguing that intelligent behaviour cannot be completely captured by symbolic descriptions. As an alternative, Dreyfus advocated a view of intelligence that stressed the need for a body that could move about, interacting directly with tangible physical objects. Once reviled by advocates of AI, Dreyfus is now regarded as a prophet of the situated approach.
Critics of nouvelle AI point out the failure to produce a system exhibiting anything like the complexity of behaviour found in real insects. Suggestions by late 20th-century researchers that their nouvelle systems would soon be conscious and possess language were entirely premature.
AI in the 21st century
In the early 21st century, faster processing power and larger datasets (“big data”) brought artificial intelligence out of the computer science departments and into the wider world. Moore’s law, the observation that computing power doubled roughly every 18 months, continued to hold true. The stock responses of Eliza fit comfortably within 50 kilobytes; the language model at the heart of ChatGPT was trained on 45 terabytes of text.
Machine learning
The ability of neural networks to take on added layers and thus work on more-complex problems increased in 2006 with the invention of the “greedy layer-wise pretraining” technique, in which it was found that it was easier to train each layer of a neural network individually than to train the whole network from input to output. This improvement in neural network training led to a type of machine learning called “deep learning,” in which neural networks have four or more layers, including the initial input and the final output. Moreover, such networks are able to learn unsupervised—that is, to discover features in data without initial prompting.
Among the achievements of deep learning have been advances in image classification in which specialized neural networks called convolution neural networks (CNNs) are trained on features found in a set of images of many different types of objects. The CNN is then able to take an input image, compare it with features in images in its training set, and classify the image as being of, for example, a cat or an apple. One such network, PReLU-net by Kaiming He and collaborators at Microsoft Research, has classified images even better than a human did.
The achievement of Deep Blue in beating world chess champion Garry Kasparov was surpassed by DeepMind’s AlphaGo, which mastered go, a much more complicated game than chess. AlphaGo’s neural networks learned to play go from human players and by playing itself. It defeated top go player Lee Sedol 4–1 in 2016. AlphaGo was in turn surpassed by AlphaGo Zero, which, starting from only the rules of go, was eventually able to defeat AlphaGo 100–0. A more general neural network, Alpha Zero, was able to use the same techniques to quickly master chess and shogi.
Autonomous vehicles
Machine learning and AI are foundational elements of autonomous vehicle systems. Through machine learning, vehicles are trained to learn from the complex data that they receive to improve the algorithms that they operate under and to expand their ability to navigate the road. AI enables these vehicles’ systems to make decisions about how to operate without needing specific instructions for each potential situation.
In order to make autonomous vehicles safe and effective, artificial simulations are created to test their capabilities. To create such simulations, black-box testing is used, in contrast to white-box validation. White-box testing, in which the internal structure of the system being tested is known to the tester, can prove the absence of failure. Black-box methods are much more complicated and involve taking a more adversarial approach. In such methods, the internal design of the system is unknown to the tester, who instead targets the external design and structure. These methods attempt to find weaknesses in the system to ensure that it meets high safety standards.
As of 2023, fully autonomous vehicles are not available for consumer purchase. Certain obstacles have proved challenging to overcome. For example, maps of almost four million miles of public roads in the United States would be needed for an autonomous vehicle to operate effectively, which presents a daunting task for manufacturers. Additionally, the most popular cars with a “self-driving” feature, those of Tesla, have raised safety concerns, as such vehicles have even headed toward oncoming traffic and metal posts. AI has not progressed to the point where cars can engage in complex interactions with other drivers or with cyclists or pedestrians. Such “common sense” is necessary to prevent accidents and enable a safe environment.
Large language models and natural language processing
Natural language processing (NLP) involves analyzing how computers can process and parse language similarly to the way humans do. To do this, NLP models must use computational linguistics, statistics, machine learning, and deep-learning models. Early NLP models were hand-coded and rule-based but did not account for exceptions and nuances in language. Statistical NLP was the next step, using probability to assign the likelihood of certain meanings to different parts of text. Modern NLP systems use deep-learning models and techniques that help them to “learn” as they process information.
Prominent examples of modern NLP are language models that use AI and statistics to predict the final form of a sentence on the basis of existing portions. One popular language model was GPT-3, released by OpenAI in June 2020. One of the first large language models, GPT-3 could solve high-school-level math problems as well as create computer programs. GPT-3 was the foundation of ChatGPT software, released in November 2022. ChatGPT almost immediately disturbed academics, journalists, and others because of concern that it was impossible to distinguish human writing from ChatGPT-generated writing. One issue with probability-based language models is “hallucinations”: rather than communicating to a user that it does not know something, the model responds with probable but factually inaccurate text based on the user’s prompts. This issue may be partially attributed to using ChatGPT as a search engine rather than in its intended role as a text generator.
Other examples of machines using NLP are voice-operated GPS systems, customer service chatbots, and language translation programs. In addition, businesses use NLP to enhance understanding of and service to consumers by auto-completing search queries and monitoring social media.
Programs such as OpenAI’s DALL-E, Stable Diffusion, and Midjourney use NLP to create images based on textual prompts, which can be as simple as “a red block on top of a green block” or as complex as “a cube with the texture of a porcupine.” The programs are trained on large datasets with millions or billions of text-image pairs—that is, images with textual descriptions.
NLP presents certain issues, especially as machine-learning algorithms and the like often express biases implicit in the content on which they are trained. For example, when asked to describe a doctor, language models may be more likely to respond with “He is a doctor” than “She is a doctor,” demonstrating inherent gender bias. Bias in NLP can have real-world consequences. For instance, in 2015 Amazon’s NLP program for résumé screening to aid in the selection of job candidates was found to discriminate against women, as women were underrepresented in the original training set collected from employees.
Virtual assistants
Virtual assistants (VAs) serve a variety of functions, including helping users schedule tasks, making and receiving calls, and guiding users on the road. These devices require large amounts of data and learn from user input to become more effective at predicting user needs and behaviour. The most popular VAs on the market are Amazon’s Alexa, Google’s G-Assistant, Microsoft’s Cortana, and Apple’s Siri. Virtual assistants differ from chatbots and conversational agents in that they are more personalized, adapting to an individual user’s behaviour and learning from it to improve their service over time.
Human-machine communication began in the 1960s with Eliza. However, the first VA was IBM’s Simon, developed in the early 1990s. In February 2010 Siri was introduced for iOS, Apple’s mobile operating system. Siri was the first VA able to be downloaded to a smartphone.
Voice assistants parse human speech by breaking it down into distinct sounds known as phonemes, using an automatic speech recognition (ASR) system. After breaking down the speech, the VA analyzes and “remembers” the tone and other aspects of the voice to recognize the user. Over time, VAs have become more sophisticated through machine learning, as they have access to many millions of words and phrases. In addition, they often use the Internet to find answers to user questions—for example, when a user asks for a weather forecast.
Risks
AI poses certain risks in terms of ethical and socioeconomic consequences. As more tasks become automated, especially in such industries as marketing and health care, many workers are poised to lose their jobs. Although AI may create some new jobs, these may require more technical skills than the jobs AI has replaced.
Moreover, AI has certain biases that are difficult to overcome without proper training. For example, U.S. police departments have begun using predictive policing algorithms to indicate where crimes are most likely to occur. However, such systems are based partly on arrest rates, which are already disproportionately high in Black communities. This may lead to over-policing in such areas, which further affects these algorithms. As humans are inherently biased, algorithms are bound to reflect human biases.
Privacy is another aspect of AI that concerns experts. As AI often involves collecting and processing large amounts of data, there is the risk that this data will be accessed by the wrong people or organizations. With generative AI, it is even possible to manipulate images and create fake profiles. AI can also be used to survey populations and track individuals in public spaces. Experts have implored policymakers to develop practices and policies that maximize the benefits of AI while minimizing the potential risks.
Is artificial general intelligence (AGI) possible?
The ongoing success of applied AI and cognitive simulation, as described in the preceding sections of this article, seems assured. However, artificial general intelligence (AGI), or strong AI—that is, artificial intelligence that aims to duplicate human intellectual abilities—remains controversial and out of reach. Exaggerated claims of success, in professional journals as well as in the popular press, have damaged its reputation. At the present time even an embodied system displaying the overall intelligence of a cockroach is proving elusive, let alone a system that can rival a human being. The difficulty of scaling up AI’s modest achievements cannot be overstated. Decades of research in symbolic AI have failed to produce any firm evidence that a symbol system can manifest human levels of general intelligence; connectionists are unable to model the nervous systems of even the simplest invertebrates; and critics of nouvelle AI regard as simply mystical the view that high-level behaviours involving language understanding, planning, and reasoning will somehow emerge from the interaction of basic behaviours such as obstacle avoidance, gaze control, and object manipulation.
However, this lack of substantial progress may simply be testimony to the difficulty of AGI, not to its impossibility. Let us turn to the very idea of AGI. Can a computer possibly think? Noam Chomsky suggests that debating this question is pointless, for it is an essentially arbitrary decision whether to extend common usage of the word think to include machines. There is, Chomsky claims, no factual question as to whether any such decision is right or wrong—just as there is no question as to whether our decision to say that airplanes fly is right, or our decision not to say that ships swim is wrong. However, this seems to oversimplify matters. The important question is: Could it ever be appropriate to say that computers think and, if so, what conditions must a computer satisfy in order to be so described?
Some authors offer the Turing test as a definition of intelligence. However, Turing himself pointed out that a computer that ought to be described as intelligent might nevertheless fail his test if it were incapable of successfully imitating a human being. For example, ChatGPT continually invokes its status as a large language model and thus would be unlikely to pass the Turing test. If an intelligent entity can fail the test, then the test cannot function as a definition of intelligence. It is even questionable whether passing the test would actually show that a computer is intelligent, as the information theorist Claude Shannon and the AI pioneer John McCarthy pointed out in 1956. Shannon and McCarthy argued that in principle it is possible to design a machine containing a complete set of canned responses to all the questions that an interrogator could possibly ask during the fixed time span of the test. Like Parry, this machine would produce answers to the interviewer’s questions by looking up appropriate responses in a giant table. This objection seems to show that in principle a system with no intelligence at all could pass the Turing test.
In fact, AI has no real definition of intelligence to offer, not even in the subhuman case. Rats are intelligent, but what exactly must an artificial intelligence achieve before researchers can claim that it has reached rats’ level of success? In the absence of a reasonably precise criterion for when an artificial system counts as intelligent, there is no objective way of telling whether an AI research program has succeeded or failed. One result of AI’s failure to produce a satisfactory criterion of intelligence is that, whenever researchers achieve one of AI’s goals—for example, a program that can summarize newspaper articles or beat the world chess champion—critics are able to say, “That’s not intelligence!” Marvin Minsky’s response to the problem of defining intelligence is to maintain—like Turing before him—that intelligence is simply our name for any problem-solving mental process that we do not yet understand. Minsky likens intelligence to the concept of “unexplored regions of Africa”: it disappears as soon as we discover it.
With only a fraction of its commonsense KB compiled, CYC could draw inferences that would defeat simpler systems. For example, CYC could infer, “Garcia is wet,” from the statement, “Garcia is finishing a marathon run,” by employing its rules that running a marathon entails high exertion, that people sweat at high levels of exertion, and that when something sweats it is wet. Among the outstanding remaining problems are issues in searching and problem solving—for example, how to search the KB automatically for information that is relevant to a given problem. AI researchers call the problem of updating, searching, and otherwise manipulating a large structure of symbols in realistic amounts of time the frame problem. Some critics of symbolic AI believe that the frame problem is largely unsolvable and so maintain that the symbolic approach will never yield genuinely intelligent systems. It is possible that CYC, for example, will succumb to the frame problem long before the system achieves human levels of knowledge.